The sources of wage variation and the direction of assortative matching : evidence from a three-way high-dimensional fixed effects regression model. by Torres,  S. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
21 June 2018
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Torres, S. and Portugal, P. and Addison, J. and Guimaraes, P. (2018) 'The sources of wage variation and the
direction of assortative matching : evidence from a three-way high-dimensional ﬁxed eﬀects regression model.',
Labour economics., 54 . pp. 47-60.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2018.06.004
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2018 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
The Sources of Wage Variation and the Direction of
Assortative Matching:
Evidence from a Three-Way High-Dimensional Fixed
Effects Regression Model
So´nia Torresa, Pedro Portugalb,g,d, John T. Addisonc,e,d, Paulo
Guimara˜esb,f,d,∗
aStatistics Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal
bBanco de Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal
cUniversity of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA
dIZA, Bonn, Germany
eDurham University, Durham, UK
fUniversidade do Porto, Porto, Portugal
gNova SBE, Lisbon, Portugal
Abstract
This paper estimates a wage equation with three high-dimensional fixed effects,
using a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset covering virtually all
Portuguese private sector wage earners over a 26-year interval. First, the vari-
ation in log real hourly wages is decomposed into three components reflecting
worker, firm, and job title characteristics and a residual element. It is found
that worker permanent heterogeneity is the most important source of wage vari-
ation accounting for one third of the wage variance, while firm permanent effects
contribute one fourth. Job title fixed effects still explain a considerable one fifth
of wage variance. Second, having established that high-wage workers tend to
match with high-paying firms, worker fixed effects from the wage equation are
next correlated with firm fixed effects from sales and value-added production
equations to provide unambiguous evidence on the sign and strength of assor-
tative matching. The correlations are positive and large, indicating that higher
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productivity workers tend to match with higher productivity firms.
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1. Introduction
This paper seeks to provide a better understanding of the sources of wage
variation and the role of sorting. Its contribution is twofold. First, in explain-
ing wage variability, it disentangles the effects of demand-side determinants of
wages from supply-side determinants in the manner of Abowd, Kramarz, and5
Margolis (1999) (AKM), while adding job title fixed effects to the mix of worker
and firm fixed effects estimated by these authors. Job title effects reflect the
distinct set of occupational tasks performed by workers that serve to define oc-
cupational boundaries. Second, it addresses the problem of non-monotonicity
typically encountered when estimating the correlation between worker- and firm10
fixed effects (even if filtered from job title heterogeneity) obtained from wage
equations because wages do not necessarily increase in firm productivity. It
provides an alternative way of addressing the correlations between the contri-
butions of worker and firm heterogeneity. It does so by observing the sales of
firms – and, for a restricted set of the data, information on firm value added –15
to estimate production equations identifying firm fixed effects. That is to say,
worker (wage) fixed effects are correlated with firm (productivity) fixed effects
to identify the sign and strength of assortative matching. The study further-
more draws on a unique matched worker-firm panel that has the advantages of
covering virtually all Portuguese workers over the interval 1986-2013.20
To anticipate our findings, it is first reported that worker permanent hetero-
geneity is the most important source of wage variation (33 percent), followed by
firm permanent effects (24.6 percent) and by job title effects (19 percent). Note
that the latter effect well exceeds the contribution of the education variable in
conventional earnings equations, although of course the allocation of workers to25
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job titles will clearly be influenced by education levels. Also the worker fixed
effects contribution is reduced materially in the three fixed effects specification,
even if remains true that ‘what workers are’ remains more important than ‘what
workers do’ and ‘for whom.’ The second and indeed major result is that the cor-
relations between the firm fixed effects obtained from the production function30
and the worker fixed effects derived from the wage equation are positive in sign
and large in magnitude, albeit declining over time, suggesting that higher pro-
ductivity workers tend to match with higher productivity firms. Interestingly,
the separate correlations between the worker (wage) fixed effect and the firm
(wage) fixed effect are also positive – contrary to similar such correlations in the35
literature based on the AKM approach – and in common with it also declining
over time.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of the
nature of worker, firm, and job title fixed effects, together with a statement of
the evolving literature on the complementarity between individual and firm pro-40
ductivity levels (i.e. assortative matching). A bare bones review of Portuguese
wage setting precedes a concise description of the data in Section 3. The general
empirical framework necessary to estimate wage equations with worker, firm,
and job title fixed effects is next reviewed in Section 4. Wage variability is
decomposed into its various components in Section 5, where the determinants45
of worker, firm, and job title fixed effects are investigated and correlations be-
tween these components of compensation are addressed. Section 6 addresses
wage sorting and in particular the direction of the correlation between worker
and firm fixed effects by worker and firm characteristics, inter al., as well as
its sensitivity to sampling plan (i.e. limited mobility bias). Section 7 considers50
assortative matching proper, now using wage and productivity data to assess
the relationship between firms wage policies and the productivity of their labor
forces and the robustness of the association. Section 8 concludes.
3
2. Wage Variation and Worker-Firm Complementarities
2.1. The sources of wage variation55
An important research theme in labor economics is why similar workers
receive different remuneration and why similar firms pay different wages (Di-
amond, 1982b). There are two lines of reasoning to explain observed wage
variability, one of which relies on standard competitive market forces (workers’
characteristics) and the other on demand-side factors (employers’ characteris-60
tics).
In a labor market operating under perfect competition, each worker should
receive a wage that equals his or her marginal (revenue) product. Wage dif-
ferentials should reflect differences in worker productivity rather than depend
on job or employer attributes (other than those affecting worker utility such65
as dangerous working conditions that will in normal circumstances attract a
compensating differential). In turn, worker productivity has a basis in com-
petence – whether observed or not – typically ‘acquired’ through investments
in human capital. Here we are abstracting from issues of unobserved intrinsic
ability (Griliches, 1977) and associated signaling models (Spence, 1973).70
There is no shortage of models seeking additional or alternative explana-
tions for wage variability, but it is now the characteristics of firms rather than
those of workers (i.e. worker competence or worker productivity differences)
that assume pole position. Given the plethora of such treatments (e.g., implicit
contract theory, principal-agent models, and efficiency wages), we will consider75
just two models that pose perhaps the sharpest contrast with the standard com-
petitive model. The first approach has a basis in rent-sharing/insider-outsider
considerations, while the second emphasizes labor market frictions.
Rent-sharing models predict that wages depend on the employer’s ability to
pay. In particular, wages are predicted to have a positive correlation with firm80
profits, since firms may find it beneficial to share their gains with their workers
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and pay above the going rate.1 These models explain why wages depend not
only on external labor market conditions but also on firm productivity, profits,
degree of competition, and turnover costs, as well as the bargaining strength of
workers. They also explain why the wages of workers from different groups of85
occupations, educational categories, and seniority tiers are higher in some firms
or industries than in others.
The other explanation for wage differentials among workers with similar
characteristics targeted here derives from the job search and matching litera-
ture and emphasizes the role of labor market frictions in wage determination.90
Thus, the equilibrium job search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) pre-
dicts that firms may have incentives to offer higher wages than their competitors
in order to guarantee a low quit rate and attract a large number of workers in
a market characterized by the existence of frictions – even in circumstances of
homogeneous workers and firms ex-ante. This model predicts that wages are in-95
creasing in firm size and workers’ job seniority. For their part, matching models
that also take into account the existence of frictions in the labor market provide
an explanation for wage dispersion. In the models of Diamond (1982a) and
Mortensen (1982), for example, while the wage is set by the employer, work-
ers and firms bargain over the share of the matching rent ex post. Differences100
in match productivity, then, explain why similar workers (firms) may receive
(offer) different wages.2
Our goal in the present exercise is to disentangle the effects of employers’
decisions (demand-side determinants of wages) from the effects of choices made
by workers (supply-side determinants) in the explanation of wage variability. To105
this end, researchers have estimated wage regressions incorporating both worker
1The earliest rent-sharing studies using industry data (e.g. Dickens and Katz, 1987) were
followed by firm studies (e.g. Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Arai, 2003). Modern treatments use
matched employer-employee data to control for unobserved worker abilities (e.g. Guertzgen,
2009; Card et al., 2013).
2For treatments combining equilibrium job search and matching, see Quercioli (1998);
Robin and Roux (2002); Mortensen (2000); Rosholm and Svarer (2004); Cahuc et al. (2006).
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and firm fixed effects, beginning with the additive worker and firm effects model
proposed by AKM (1999) in their pioneering work using a French longitudinal
matched employer-employee dataset. However, besides worker and firm hetero-
geneity, a third important dimension of wage formation is job title heterogeneity,110
reflecting the distinct tasks performed by workers that define the set of occupa-
tional boundaries. There are a variety of reasons why job title heterogeneity can
be expected to influence wage rates. One is compensating advantages for riskier
and/or less pleasant working environments. Another is provided by the heavy
doses of job specific training that some jobs may entail. Additional reasons in-115
clude occupational crowding and collective bargaining (encompassing different
wage floors, promotion policies, and negotiated job titles). A high job title fixed
effect is a job title remunerated at higher than expected levels after allowing for
the observed and unobserved permanent characteristics of firms and workers.
To properly incorporate these determinants of wages one needs a very detailed120
accounting of the kind of jobs being undertaken by workers. Even a highly
disaggregated occupational count is unlikely to be fit for purpose here because
an employer’s wage policy for the same occupation (e.g. a secretary) might be
governed by different collective agreements (say the banking industry collective
agreement as opposed to that for the retail trade sector) or, in the case of a125
single industry agreement, individuals ostensibly doing the same job within a
firm might receive different wages and hence occupy different job titles given
their different exposure to risk.
Fortunately, the dataset used in the present inquiry contains an unusually
rich set of information enabling us to identify the collective agreement that regu-130
lates the employment contract applicable to each worker. Moreover, within each
collective agreement, we can further pinpoint the exact, detailed occupational
category of each worker. Each year, around 300 different collective agreements
are negotiated in Portugal (see below) that define wage floors for each particular
job title (so-called categoria profissional). On average, each collective agreement135
defines the wage floor for around 100 job titles. Overall in a given year, there
are 30,000 collective agreement/job title combinations to which workers can be
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allocated. The main use of the dataset – the Quadros de Pessoal and its succes-
sor survey the Relato´rio U´nico (see below) – is precisely to enable the officials
of the Portuguese Ministry of Employment to ascertain whether employers are140
in compliance with what was actually agreed to at the bargaining table (i.e.
wages, work schedules, and other conditions). This recording obligation also
serves to underscore the accuracy of the Portuguese data.
By properly taking job title effects into account one should be able to provide
refined estimates of worker and firm fixed effects, and shed additional light on145
the current debate concerning the role of assortative matching. In the process,
we should also be able to disentangle the joint contribution of collective contracts
and occupational category to wage formation, using dummies for each contract
and each occupation.
The objective of this part of the estimation, then, is to calculate the con-150
tribution of worker, firm, and job title fixed effects to overall wage variability.
The requirements of this decomposition exercise are daunting; specifically, the
availability of longitudinal datasets combining information on firms and their
employees (namely, matched employer-employee datasets with unique identi-
fiers for firms, workers, and job titles) and the use of appropriate panel data155
econometric techniques to estimate three high-dimension fixed effects in wage
equations. Fortunately, panel datasets have become available in recent years for
many countries, while econometric tools (and computing capacity) have also im-
proved greatly. Taken in conjunction, all three ingredients – data, econometric
techniques, and computing facilities – have made it possible to bring new infor-160
mation to bear in the empirical debate on (many aspects of) wage determinants.
As was noted earlier, AKM were the first to propose an empirical framework for
estimating worker and firm effects in wage equations. They reported that worker
characteristics explained the major part of wage differentials, of inter-industry
wage differentials, and of firm-size wage differentials.165
Here, we shall use a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset cov-
ering virtually all employees in Portugal (see below). In estimating a wage
equation that includes worker and firm fixed effects, we use a routine that was
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especially developed in Stata providing an exact solution to the least squares
problem that arises when dealing with very high dimension matrices. However,170
we take this methodology a stage further by adding a third fixed effect in our
wage equation so as to control explicitly for job title heterogeneity.
2.2. Assortative matching
The sorting of heterogeneous workers across firms has been the subject of
not inconsiderable debate. The idea behind positive assortative matching is175
the complementarity between individual and plant productivity levels, with
good workers being teamed up with good firms. The theoretical basis for such
matching is provided by assignment models. In his marriage market model,
Becker (1973, 826) shows that if the production function is supermodular the
unique equilibrium that occurs is both efficient and characterized by perfect180
sorting. The early assignment models, however, were rooted in competitive equi-
librium (e.g. Sattinger, 1993; Kremer and Maskin, 1996), thereby disregarding
establishment-specific components in the wage equation. With the introduction
of frictions, more recent developments have ensured a sorting of workers across
plants (Shimer and Smith, 2000; Shimer, 2005; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002).185
At issue in these models is the nature of the equilibrium matching pattern since
different matching models predict different patterns (i.e. admitting of either
positive or zero/negative assortative matching) according to the assumptions of
the model.
Empirical work has often failed to produce evidence of positive assorta-190
tive matching in the wake of AKM’s (1999) pioneering study. Using matched
employer-employee data for 1976-1987 for a 1/25th sample of the French labor
force, these authors decomposed wages into fixed firm and person effects and
reported a positive albeit weak correlation between the two. However, these
results were obtained on the basis of statistical approximations, limited by the195
capacity of the computers on which they were generated. In re-estimating the
model using exact methods, Abowd et al. (2002) report that the correlation
between the person and firm effect is -0.283 (rather than 0.097 using the former
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methodology). The authors also report correlations between the two effects for
a 1/10th sample of employees in the state of Washington, using matched data200
for 1984-1993. The corresponding coefficients were -0.025 and 0.050 for the ex-
act and approximate estimates, respectively. And, as noted earlier, negative
correlations have indeed figured largely in the literature using the wage data
approach (e.g. Goux and Maurin, 1999; Gruetter and Lalive, 2009), although a
notable exception is Card et al. (2013) in an investigation of German earnings205
dispersion over 1985-2009.
Although negative assortative matching may have an economic explanation
(see also Woodcock, 2010), research has sought to determine whether this result
might be an artifact of the use of standard econometric techniques. Abowd et al.
(2004) test and discount the notion that the negative correlation between the210
fixed worker and employer effects (i.e. good workers gravitating to bad firms)
is caused by limited mobility bias in the estimation of each effect. They con-
clude that while sampling error does impart downward bias to the two effects,
its magnitude is simply too small to modify the basic negative result for France
or the absence of correlation for the United States (i.e. random assignment).215
A more forthright conclusion is reached by Andrews et al. (2008), who show
that the correlations between the two fixed effects will be downwardly biased if
there is true positive assortative matching and when any conditioning covariates
are uncorrelated with the two fixed effects. The authors’ simulations indicate
that the extent of bias is a decreasing function of worker mobility which in turn220
reflects the propensity to move, the length of the panel, and the average size
of firms. In applying formulae to correct the bias to West German matched
employer employee data for 1993-1997, the authors find evidence of not incon-
siderable bias: some 25 percent for the full sample, increasing to around 50
percent for the subsample of movers. Although in this study the biases are225
large, they do not overturn the negative correlation between the worker and
plant effects. However, in their subsequent analysis of social security records for
three German La¨nder, Andrews et al. (2012) report that low mobility bias does
indeed obscure an estimated correlation that is strongly positive.
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A recent paper by Card et al. (2018) reviews the various technical reserva-230
tions that attach to the AKM model – including, in addition to limited mobility
bias, the identification of age and time effects, exogenous mobility, and additive
separability – in a framework that sees that model alongside studies of rent
seeking as offering key insights into understanding the determinants of wage
inequality. The findings of both literatures are then interpreted using a search235
model, or more strictly a monopsony model in which workers’ idiosyncratic
tastes for different workplaces allow firms to set wages unilaterally and share
rents only by reason of information asymmetries. That is, a microeconomic
model is used to mimic the results obtained from rent seeking studies and the
AKM two-way fixed effects estimator, in both of which settings workers bargain240
with firms over wages. In the process, Card et al. (2018) necessarily offer, in
addition to findings from cross-sectional and within-job models of rent sharing,
results on the relationship between the AKM components of wages and mean
log value added per worker. This study uses matched employer-employee data
for Portugal, 2005-2009. As the base dataset partially coincides with that used245
in the present inquiry, we will have occasion to further comment on the results
obtained by Card et al. (2018) in section 7.
The perception that one cannot distinguish positive from negative sorting
using wage data – or the related concern that theoretical models can generate
positive or negative correlations between firm and person effects from a wage250
equation – explains why some have advocated using a productivity model directly
rather than inferentially. Unlike the more numerous studies employing wage
data, those using output data point decisively to positive assortative matching.
As a case in point, using Portuguese matched employer-employee data from
the Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2000, and a translog specification, Mendes et al.255
(2010) estimate a firm-specific productivity effect for each firm that they then
relate to the skills of workers in the firm measured as the time average of the
share of highly-educated workers in the firm. They find evidence of positive
assortative matching, especially among longer-lived firms. They report that the
results are not caused by heterogeneity in search frictions by worker skill type.260
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Other studies have centered squarely on issues of bias in the standard model.
Thus, Lopes de Melo (2008) argues that the approach to measure sorting us-
ing worker and firm fixed effects in a log-linear wage regression as proxies for
worker constant heterogeneity is biased against detecting it. His sorting model
with frictions yields strong positive sorting, with good workers teamed with265
good firms because of complementarities in production. It is argued that this
outcome is hidden because of non-monotonicities in the wage equation caused
by the interaction between wage bargaining and the limited ability of the firms
to post new vacancies. This in turn arises because high productivity firms have
better outside options than their low productivity counterparts, which causes270
downward pressure on the wages of their workers, especially low-wage work-
ers who are then paid less when working for a more productive firm. Lopes
de Melo’s distinct solution is to examine the correlation between a worker’s
wage fixed effect and the average fixed effect of the coworkers in the same firm.
His correction yields strong evidence of positive assortative matching, unlike275
the conventional measure which yields an absence of sorting when applied to
Brazilian matched employer-employee data, 1995-2005. In a subsequent analy-
sis, Lopes de Melo (2018) demonstrates that his earlier results on sorting were
not driven by worker composition. More importantly, he uses the AKM corre-
lations as moments to match in a structural model. The model performs well280
in explaining the correlations between fixed effects if not the dispersion in firm
fixed effects.
In the final (structural) study considered here, Hagedorn et al. (2017) es-
chew use of a fixed effects regression approach while nonetheless accepting that
all parameters of the classic model of sorting based on absolute advantage (i.e.285
workers and firms can be ranked on their productivity) with search frictions
can be identified using only matched employer-employee data on wages and
labor market transitions.3 Hagedorn et al. (2017) develop strategies for rank-
3Only Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) argue that the use of worker and firm fixed effects
does not enable one to conclude anything about assortative matching as the particular non-
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ing worker and firms, as well as an implementation algorithm. The ranking of
workers in this very different schema proceeds on the basis of deriving several290
(equivalent) statistics that are monotonically increasing in worker type, x: the
lowest and highest accepted wages in firms, and the adjusted (for unemploy-
ment) average wage. For its part, firm ranking proceeds on the derivation of
a statistic that is monotonically increasing in firm type, y. The value of a job
vacancy is first established to be monotonically increasing in a firm’s productiv-295
ity and, since the surplus of a vacancy is also increasing in y, Nash bargaining
implies that the average surplus of workers is also increasing in y. The authors
then show that this surplus can be expressed as a function of wages; specifically,
the worker’s surplus is proportional to the difference between the wage and the
reservation wage. The latter statistic is increasing in firm type and is the basis300
for ranking firms. The link is that, once workers are ranked, similarly ranked
workers must have similar reservation wages. Having ranked workers and firms,
the rank correlation between workers of type x and firms of type y denotes the
direction and strength of sorting. 4
What is our takeaway from the foregoing? Taken in the round, the pes-305
simistic assessment of the literature on the use of worker and firm fixed effects
derived from the wage equation to address assortative matching should not be
taken to rule out the use of worker fixed effects derived from the wage equation.
Rather, the critique hinges on the particular derivation of the firm fixed effect
given that firm productivity is not increasing in wages. Thus, Lopes de Melo310
(2008, 3) states: “We propose an alternative measure of sorting, still based on
the same fixed effects methodology, that captures the degree of sorting in the
monotonic effect of firm type on wages translates into a wage that cannot then be decomposed
into an additively separate worker and firm fixed effect. However, as shown by Hagedorn et al.
(2017, 43 et seq.), the specific modeling choices made by these authors “ultimately prevent
the identification of the model.”
4The actual value of the match is recouped from a production function obtained by inverting
the wage equation. The determinants are actual wages and the two measured outside options,
namely the value of a vacancy and the value of unemployment.
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model remarkably well: the correlation between a worker fixed effect and the
average fixed effects of his coworkers.” Vulgo: the conventional worker fixed
effects are retained, only the firm-fixed effects derived from the wage equation315
are replaced. Lopes de Melo (2008, 4) reports that non-monotonicities do not
affect the ordering of wages across workers, noting that wages (and average
worker wages) are unambiguously increasing in worker skill (but not firm pro-
ductivity), and that in simulations worker fixed effects almost perfectly capture
the relative ranking of workers. Not even Eeckhout and Kircher (2011, 879-320
880) claim that wages w(x, y) are non-monotone in x (only in y). Rather more
positively, they confirm that the wage (unlike profits and output) is increasing
in worker type (pp. 879-880) and alone permit identification of worker type
(p. 900). Only Hagedorn et al. (2017, 30) critique the notion that wages are
monotone in worker productivity, but nevertheless conclude that the “key prob-325
lem ... underlying the fixed effect regression is the assumption that wages are
monotone in firm’s productivity (fixed effect)” because it is inconsistent with
sorting models incorporating search frictions.
Still at issue is the use of the standard correlation between worker and firm
fixed effects as a moment to match in structural models such as those of Hage-330
dorn et al. (2017) and Lopes de Melo (2018). This is because the results that
are obtained in these treatments may be sensitive to additional assumptions in
the model (Borovicˇkova´ and Shimer, 2017, 5-6). This caveat serves also to cau-
tion against the considerable appeal of exercises such as the former study that
require data from matched employer-employee data on wages and labor market335
transitions alone in a model more firmly located in search theory.
In recognition of non-monotonicities in firm type noted in the evolving liter-
ature, we shall refine our treatment of assortative matching to include firm level
productivity filtered from the heterogeneity of labor inputs. That is, we retain
the worker fixed effect but replace the AKM firm effects with firm productivity340
estimates derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function where labor input is
differentiated by job title. We will assume that endogenous mobility bias is not
a cause of great concern, but show how limited mobility bias is less important
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in longer samples.
3. Institutional Context and Data345
3.1. Wage Setting Framework
Wage setting in Portugal is dominated by the widespread use of govern-
ment extensions of sectoral agreements and the presence of mandatory minimum
wages. There is a modicum of firm-level bargaining but formally decentralized
bargaining of this nature is the exception rather than the rule – covering less350
than 10 percent of the workforce – and often taking place in large enterprises
that were formerly part of the public sector. Sectoral agreements predominate.
They are conducted by employer and union confederations and may cover a wide
range of industry-specific occupations. That said, the system does not rule out
parallelism or overlapping collective agreements, such that a single enterprise355
may be covered by two or more agreements depending on the union affiliation
of its workers. Indeed, the situation may be further stratified if the firm in
question straddles more than one line of economic activity, thereby belonging
to more than one employers’ association. As a result of union fragmentation,
therefore, several agreements may coexist for the same region, occupation, and360
firm. Horizontal agreements, covering a number of sectors, are also possible, but
are not frequent. Overall, coverage of collective agreements in the Portuguese
private sector is above 90 percent.
Collective bargaining in Portugal differs from that in other nations by virtue
of its fragmentation and extent of multi-unionism. The corollary is that the365
contents of collective agreements are at once extensive and general. They are
extensive insofar as they cover many categories of workers. They are general in
that they set only minimum conditions of which the most important is base level
monthly wages, although some agreements include normal working hours and
overtime pay. The focus is upon wage floors – on average branch agreements370
have set wages for around 100 job titles, or categorias profissionais – rather
than anticipated wage growth that in some centralized bargaining regimes (e.g.
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Sweden) is directly incorporated into sectoral agreements. In consequence, em-
ployers have freedom of maneuver to tailor remuneration to their prevailing eco-
nomic circumstances:5 Collective bargaining sets wage levels not wage changes.375
The most relevant mechanism shaping the formation of wages is the sys-
tematic extension of industry-wide agreements by the Ministry of Employment.
Even though by law the collective agreement only binds the trade union mem-
bers and the employer associations’ affiliated firms that are parties to the agree-
ment, not only are voluntary extensions common but also and altogether more380
importantly industry-wide agreements are systematically extended throughout
the sector via so-called portarias de extensa˜o by the Ministry of Employment
following a request from either or both of the parties to the agreement. This
means that even wage agreements reached by trade unions and employers associ-
ations with very low representation have a strong impact in setting wage floors.385
Indeed, in any given year, allowing for this near automatic extension procedure,
collective bargaining determines around 30,000 minimum wages that correspond
to 30,000 job titles.
Finally, wage floors are also set under national minimum wage machinery,
established in 1974. The minimum wage can exceed that set under sectoral390
bargaining. In this event of course the former dominates. Currently, the na-
tional minimum wage covers some 16 percent of full-time wage earners. We will
subsequently examine in section 6 how restricting the sample to minimum wage
earners influences the correlation between worker and firm fixed effects.
3.2. Data395
The Portuguese data used in this inquiry come from a longitudinal matched
employer-employee dataset known as the Tables of Personnel (or Quadros de
Pessoal) for the years 1986 to 2009 (excepting 1990 and 2001) and from its vir-
tually identical successor survey the Single Report (or Relato´rio U´nico) for the
5On the determinants of the contractual wage and this ‘wage cushion,’ see Cardoso and
Portugal (2005); Addison et al. (2017).
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years 2010 to 2013. This unique dataset is administered by the Portuguese Min-400
istry of Employment, and is taken from a mandatory annual survey of all firms
with at least one wage earner in the reference month – March of each year un-
til 1993, October thereafter. The survey covers various firm and establishment
characteristics, as well as a set of characteristics of the workforce (see below).
Being compulsory, it does not suffer from the non-response problems that often405
plague standard household and firm surveys. Further, the survey covers all Por-
tuguese wage earners, with the exceptions of the Public Administration sector
and domestic servants.
Turning to specifics, the dataset includes information on the establishment
(identifier, location, industry, and employment), the firm (firm identifier, loca-410
tion, industry, legal form, ownership, year of formation, employment, sales,
and capital), and its workers (social security identifier, gender, age, educa-
tion, skills, occupation, employment status, professional level, seniority, earnings
[base wage, seniority-related earnings, other regular and irregular benefits, and
overtime pay], normal and overtime hours, time elapsed since last promotion,415
professional category and the corresponding classification in a collective agree-
ment).
For the purposes of this exercise, a subset of variables was selected, certain
new variables created, and some observations removed. The final set of variables
retained for analysis is given in Table A.1. Among the restrictions placed on the420
data were the exclusion of those individuals who were not working full time, who
were aged less than 16 years or more than 64 years, who earned a nominal wage
less than 80 percent of the legal minimum wage, who recorded errors in their
admission/birth dates, and who had duplicate social security codes or other
errors in those codes. Individuals employed in the agriculture, hunting, forestry425
and fishing sectors – together with misclassified industries – were also excluded.
Further, we also excised close to 2 percent of observations that did not belong
to the largest connected set. For a model with two fixed effects, Abowd et al.
(2002) noted that for identification purposes one needs to impose one restriction
on the coefficients for each mobility group in the data; where a mobility group430
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contains all workers and firms that are connected, comprising all the workers who
ever worked for any of the firms in the group and all the firms at which any of
the workers were ever employed. With several mobility groups (and thus several
restrictions) the estimated coefficients of the fixed effects are not comparable
across groups. If these coefficients are of interest, then a simple solution is to435
work only with the largest mobility group which usually comprises the majority
of the observations. With three fixed effects a similar logic applies. Since we
want to use the estimates of the fixed effects for posterior analysis, we restricted
the data set to connected observations for which comparability of the estimates
of the fixed effects is assured. 6 As noted above, the largest group accounted440
for more than 98 percent of the data set.
Our final dataset for all 26 available survey years comprises 36,558,896 ob-
servations drawn from 649,589 different firms, 5,945,393 individual workers, and
133,598 job titles (i.e. the code of the variable that results from the conflation
of the professional category variable and the corresponding collective agreement445
variable).
We also make use of the Central de Balanc¸os (CB) dataset, which con-
tains yearly economic and financial information for all non-financial Portuguese
corporations since 2006. The available information allows us to compute an ac-
curate measure of firm value added which we then merge into our final dataset.450
Matching of the two datasets still leaves us with 253,651 firms.
4. The General Empirical Framework to Decompose Wage Variation
Consider the problem of estimating a standard Mincerian wage equation to
which we add three high-dimensional fixed effects to account for firm, worker,
and job-title heterogeneity:455
lnwifjt = Xiftβ + θi + φf + λj + εifjt . (1)
6The algorithm of Weeks and Williams (1964) was used to identify connected observations.
When this algorithm is applied to the setting with two fixed effects we obtain the mobility
groups.
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In the above equation, lnwifjt stands for the natural logarithm of the real
hourly wage of individual i (i = 1, ..., N) working at firm f (f = 1, ..., F ) and
holding a job title j (j = 1, ..., J) at year t (t = 1, ..., Ti), while Xift is a vector
of k observed (measured) time-varying exogenous characteristics of individual i
and firm f . There are Ti observations for each individual i and a total of N
∗
460
observations. All time-invariant characteristics of the workers, firms and job
titles are captured by the fixed effects which are, respectively, θi, φf , and λj . We
assume that exogenous mobility holds in our model, meaning that conditional on
the explanatory variables, the random term εifjt has an expected value of zero.
7 According to this equation, there are five distinct sources of wage variability:465
1. the observed time-varying characteristics of workers, firms, and the econ-
omy (Xiftβ);
2. non-time-varying worker heterogeneity (θi);
3. non-time-varying firm heterogeneity (φf );
4. non-time-varying job title heterogeneity (λj); and,470
5. unexplained random variation (εifjt).
Equation (1) includes three high-dimensional fixed effects. Estimation of linear
regression models with more than one high-dimensional fixed effect poses some
particular challenges. The problem was first tackled by Abowd and Kramarz
(1999) and Abowd et al. (1999). In their seminal papers, these authors proposed475
a computationally tractable solution that yielded an approximation to the full
least squares solution of a linear regression model with two high-dimensional
fixed effects. In a later paper, Abowd et al. (2002) presented a conjugate gradi-
ent algorithm that led to the exact least squares solution of this problem. More
recently, Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010) demonstrated that it is possible to480
7A recent study by Card et al. (2016) has shown that this assumption is reasonable for
the Portuguese data. The authors applied the tests for exogenous mobility proposed by Card
et al. (2013) to the Quadros de Pessoal dataset. They did not find any evidence supporting
the correlation of the residual components of wages with specific patterns of mobility.
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obtain the exact least squares solution for linear regression models with two or
more high-dimensional fixed effects with a full Gauss-Seidel iterative algorithm.
5. The Role of Individual, Firm, and Job Title Heterogeneity in Wage
Differentials
In order to decompose wage variability into the components identified earlier,485
we first estimated equation (1). The explanatory variables (or observed time-
varying characteristics) are age squared,8 tenure, tenure squared, firm size, and
23 (survey) year dummies. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
the real hourly wage. The results are reported in Table 1, with separate results
being provided in the first column of the table for the two high dimensional490
fixed effects case. In both columns, as expected, wages increase with tenure and,
familiarly, larger firms also pay higher wages. Observe that the R2 terms of both
equations are considerably higher than observed for standard wage regressions.
Thus, the worker fixed effects, firm fixed effects, job title fixed effects, and
worker and firm time-varying characteristics together explain 89.2 percent of495
the variability in real wages. That said, the addition of job title fixed effects
does not add materially to the explanation of wages, as without them the R2 is
still 88 percent. Rather, as we shall see, the contribution of job title fixed effects
accrues via its role as a component of wage variation (see Table 5, below).
Table 1 around here500
In this framework, it will be recalled that the worker fixed effects (θi) include
both the workers’ unobserved and observed but non-time-varying characteris-
tics. Similarly, the firm fixed effects (φf ) and job title fixed effects (λj) include
both the unobserved and observed but non-time-varying firm and job title char-
acteristics, respectively. We decomposed the three estimated fixed effects into505
8A linear term in age is excluded as its coefficient cannot be estimated in a model that
includes worker fixed effects and year fixed effects. This is simply a manifestation of the
conventional cohort-age-calendar year identification problem.
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these components by estimating the following three regression equations: first,
θ̂i = const.+ Wiη + εi , (2)
where Wi is a vector of non-time-varying worker characteristics (comprising
gender, education, and birth-year dummies), η is the associated vector of coef-
ficients, and Wiη is the worker non-time-varying observed characteristics com-
ponent. Note that αi, the worker specific intercept αi – capturing the effect of510
worker unobserved characteristics, which can be interpreted as the opportunity
cost or the market valuation of worker heterogeneity – is obtained residually by
α̂i = θ̂i −Wiη̂;
φ̂f = const.+ Zfγ + εf , (3)
where Zf is a vector of non-time-varying firm characteristics (five regional dum-
mies; capital ownership, specifically, the shares of domestic and public capital;515
and twenty-eight industry dummies), γ is the associated vector of coefficients,
and Zfγ is the firm non-time-varying observed characteristics component.
9 As
before, the firm-specific intercept, ϕf , capturing the firm unobserved character-
istics effect, is obtained residually, by ϕ̂f = φ̂f − Zf γ̂; and third,
λ̂j = FEoccup + FEca + εj , (4)
where the sum of the two fixed effects (FEj), one for the occupation variable520
FEoccup and the other for the collective agreement variable FEca, corresponds
to the non-time-varying observed characteristics component and δ̂j , the job title
specific intercept capturing the job title unobserved characteristics effect, is
9We assume that the variables included in Z capture the structural characteristics of firms,
changes in which over time are either nonexistent or too small to be considered time-varying
and requiring their direct incorporation as explanatory variables into equation (1). The same
reasoning applies to the education variable for workers in equation (2), and to the occupa-
tion and collective agreement arguments in equation (4). Note further that the Portuguese
industrial classification system changed in 1995. Because of this change, and given that the
regression covers the entire period, we constructed an aggregated common classification com-
prising 29 different industries.
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obtained residually by δ̂j = λ̂j− F̂Ej . We now have the following compensation
components (plus the residual):525
• Xijtβ̂: observed worker, firm, and economy time-varying characteristics
that comprise three components: time dummies, time-varying character-
istics of workers, and time-varying characteristics of firms.
• θ̂i: worker fixed effects.
– Wiη̂: observed worker non-time-varying characteristics.530
– α̂i: unobserved constant worker characteristics.
• φ̂f : firm fixed effects.
– Zf γ̂: observed firm non-time-varying characteristics.
– ϕ̂f : unobserved constant firm characteristics.
• λ̂j : job title fixed effects.535
– F̂Ej : observed job title non-time-varying characteristics.
– δ̂j : unobserved constant job title characteristics.
Tables 2 and 3 report the estimation results for the worker fixed effects
and the firm fixed effects regressions, respectively. Beginning with Table 2,
we observe that the worker fixed effects for females are on average 14.3 log540
points smaller than those for men. Further, there is a monotonically increasing
premium associated with the education level: a worker who has completed the
second stage of tertiary education shows a fixed effect that is on average 54.3 log
points larger than that of a worker with pre-primary or no formal completed ed-
ucation (the reference category). Note that these results are pure effects; that is,545
they result from a regression in which the dependent variable (the worker fixed
effects) was estimated through a regression that controlled simultaneously for
the time-varying characteristics of workers and firms and for firm and job-title
heterogeneity. Overall, these non-time-varying worker characteristics explain
64.4 percent of the variability in worker fixed effects.550
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Table 2 around here
From Table 3 we see that the geographic location of the firm, together with
its capital ownership, size (as measured by the number of employees), and in-
dustry affiliation play important roles in explaining the differences in the firm
fixed effects. Specifically, the firm fixed effects are larger throughout all NUTS555
II (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) regions than in the north
region (the reference category) but especially so for Lisboa and the Algarve; the
firm fixed effects tend to be higher among firms with larger shares of foreign cap-
ital; and there is also strong evidence of material differences in firm fixed effects
across different industries. Note again that these effects are pure effects, as they560
result from a regression in which the dependent variable (the firm fixed effect)
was estimated via a regression that controlled simultaneously for time-varying
characteristics of workers and firms and for worker and job-title heterogeneity.
Table 3 around here
The estimation results for the job title fixed effects regression are not re-565
ported here as the explanatory variables are two high-dimension fixed effects.
Note that equation (4) has a different specification from equations (2) and (3)
above. This is due to the nature of the explanatory variables chosen for equa-
tion (4). Collective agreement and (harmonized) occupation are both categorical
variables with too many outcomes to be included explicitly as dummy variables570
(1,516 and 447 different outcomes, respectively, for the entire period). There-
fore, we decided to include them as two fixed effects. This is equivalent to the
least square dummy variable approach (LSDV) of a fixed effects estimation.
We can summarize the estimation results as follows: the R2 of this equation is
0.696, meaning that the two observed non-time-varying job title characteristics575
(occupation and collective agreement) explain 69.6 percent of the variability in
job title fixed effects. The largest role is attributable to occupation, as the R2 of
an equation containing only this variable explains 56.8 percent of the variability
in job title fixed effects, whereas the R2 of an equation with just the collective
agreement argument explains 39.4 percent of that variability.580
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Table 4 around here
In Table 4, we report the correlations among the components of log real
hourly wages. Of the four main components – time-varying characteristics,
worker fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and job title fixed effects – the job title
fixed effects component shows the highest correlation with log real total com-585
pensation (0.67), followed next by the firm fixed effects component (0.61), then
by the worker fixed effects component (0.54), and finally by the individual and
firm time varying characteristics component (0.23). Both the observed and un-
observed components of the worker fixed effects are highly correlated with the
log of real total compensation (0.35 and 0.43, respectively). Concerning the590
components of the firm fixed effects, the observable part is that most highly
correlated with log real total compensation (0.53). The unobserved part of the
firm component is less important in determining total compensation. As re-
gards the components of the job title fixed effect, the observable part is also
the most highly correlated with the log of real total compensation (0.62), while595
the unobserved part is altogether less relevant. In sum, with the exception of
the worker fixed effect, the observable part of each component is more highly
correlated with the log of real total compensation than the unobservable part.
In addition, we find that the correlation between firms’ wage policies (as
proxied by the firm fixed effects) and the quality of their workforces (captured600
by the worker fixed effects) is positive (0.20). Although not large, this value
is nonetheless much larger than that reported in the literature. For example,
Abowd et al. (2002) report a negative correlation for France and a correlation
close to zero for the state of Washington (see also the lower estimates in Goux
and Maurin (1999), using Labor Force Survey data).605
The correlations in Table 4 also suggest an interpretation as regards sort-
ing. In terms of observable characteristics, there is evidence of good workers
tending to be found in high-paying firms: the correlation coefficient between the
corresponding components of the firm and worker fixed effects is 0.26. These
results are, then, partly consistent with this literature. However, as discussed610
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earlier, we should resist the temptation of interpreting this positive correlation
as evidence of complementarity between worker and firm levels of productivity.
Table 4 further indicates that the correlation coefficient between worker fixed
effects and job title fixed effects (0.41) is larger than that between firm fixed
effects and job title fixed effects (0.26). The latter effect indicates that high615
paying jobs tend to go hand in hand with high-paying firms. In both cases, the
correlations are larger in terms of the observable characteristics of workers and
firms (0.37 and 0.33, respectively).
Finally, these results are largely mirrored in Table A.2 which presents the
correlations between compensation components for the two dimensional fixed ef-620
fects specification. Thus, for example, we observe a positive correlation between
firm and worker fixed effects of 0.23, closely similar to that reported earlier for
the full model. In sum, these two sets of results indicate that the relationship
between firms’ wage policies and the quality of the workers they select is posi-
tive, while suggesting that there are certainly factors other than wage policies625
that explain the distribution of high-ability workers across firms.
Next, to measure the contributions of worker, firm, and job title character-
istics (both observed and unobserved) to wage variation, we used the following
decomposition:
lnwifjt = Xiftβ + αi + Wiη + ϕf + Zfγ + δj + FEj + εifjt =
10∑
p=1
Cpifjt , (5)
where the Cpifjt represent the individual summands (Xift comprising the three630
components described above, namely time and the time-varying characteristics
of workers and firms) of the wage equation. The contribution of each component,
Cpifjt, can be calculated as:
cov(lnwifjt, C
p
ifjt)
V ar(lnwifjt)
, (6)
where, by definition,
∑10
p=1 Cov(lnwifjt, C
p
ifjt)/V ar(lnwifjt) = 1.
Table 5 around here635
24
In Table 5 we report the contribution of each component to real hourly
wage variation. Separate results are provided for samples with two and three
high dimensional fixed effects. Beginning with the latter, it can be seen that
the largest contribution to wage variation comes from worker fixed effects (33.0
percent), followed by firm fixed effects (24.6 percent), job title effects (19.0640
percent), and then by individual, firm, and aggregate time-varying effects (12.4
percent). There is a residual contribution of 11.0 percent. Accordingly, when
comparing worker and job title effects, for example, it follows that what workers
‘are’ is more important than what workers ‘do.’ Nevertheless, the latter broadly
matches the magnitude of the ‘for whom’ contribution. Of the worker fixed645
effects, the unobserved sub-component makes a marginally smaller contribution
(16.4 percent) than do the gender, education, and birth-year sub-components
(16.6 percent). For the firm fixed effects, the two sub-components contributions
are again almost the same (at 12.6 percent and 12.0 percent for the unobserved
and observed components, respectively). Finally, in the case of the job title650
fixed effects, the unobserved component makes a much smaller contribution
(4.1 percent) than does the observed component (14.9 percent).
The contrast with the specification containing only two high dimensional
effects is immediate, where 47.9 percent of wage variation is accounted for by
worker fixed effects and 27.1 percent by firm fixed effects. Clearly, given that655
the firm fixed effects are close and the individual, firm, and aggregate time-
varying effects practically the same in the two specifications, worker fixed effect
component is picking up much of the job title effect in the forms of occupational
and contractual heterogeneity.
6. A Detour on Wage Sorting660
In this brief section we tackle two issues that have arisen in exploiting a
log wage regression to estimate worker and firm fixed effects, more specifically
their correlation. We shall refer to the correlation as providing evidence of wage
sorting, as opposed to productivity sorting which cannot be identified directly
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from wage data alone. The first issue concerns the sensitivity of the correlation665
between worker and firm fixed effects to worker, firm, regional, and industry
characteristics. The second issue, which has been more widely examined in the
literature, is the tendency for the size and sign of the correlations between the
worker and firm fixed affects to be biased downward the fewer the workers who
move between firms in the data (see Andrews et al., 2012).670
Table 6 around here
Table 6 presents the correlations between worker and firm fixed effects from
the wage equation by age group, gender, tenure, education, broad wage category,
firm size and age, region and industry. It is clear that the correlations are in-
creasing in age, tenure, and education (up to the tertiary level at least). On the675
other hand, they are lower for college graduates and minimum wage earners. For
its part, wage sorting is more pronounced for males than for females. Increasing
wage sorting by age and tenure is expected for at least two reasons: first, because
older and more senior workers are more likely to have been matched to (larger)
and higher paying firms (Haltiwanger et al., 2018); and, second, because their680
fixed effects are likely to be less subject to measurement error as they can be ob-
served over a longer time span, thereby reducing the bias due to finite sampling
and limited mobility. More educated workers are expected to be more efficient
searchers who match to higher paying firms, while the indication that the cor-
relation is small for college graduates may simply reflect the fact that college685
graduates in the Portuguese labor market are young and short-tenured. For its
part, binding minimum wage legislation renders wages incapable of functioning
as prices, preempting any possibility of discriminating among the market values
of worker skills. In this sense, it is not surprising that the correlation between
worker and firm fixed effects is strongly negative. But one should nevertheless690
recall that minimum wage earners tend to be at the beginning of their working
careers, often working in low paying, small firms. With respect to gender, the
lower degree of wage sorting observed among women may be related to the find-
ing that women more frequently work in firms with monopsony power (Fe´lix
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and Portugal, 2016). The measure of wage sorting is also strongly influenced by695
firm size. As before, this may reflect true wage sorting, in the sense that larger,
more mature firms have more structured internal labor markets with job ladders
that are more efficient in allocating higher skilled workers to better paying jobs
– or, to some degree, this may simply reflect the fact that the firm fixed effect
is determined with more precision whenever firms are larger and older. Within700
industries, it can be seen that Manufacturing and Other Services exhibit the
highest correlation coefficients, in part because these are the industries with the
largest average firm sizes. A similar argument can be made with respect to
the Lisboa and North regions. The bottom line therefore is that compositional
factors play a role in explaining wage sorting (for a discussion of wage sorting705
by compositional trends in education, age, and gender, see Bagger et al., 2013).
Table 7 around here
Table 7 investigates the sensitivity of wage sorting measures to different
sampling plans. In this endeavor, we first compute, for each subsample, the
linear correlation coefficients obtained from the estimated worker and firm fixed710
effects generated in the full sample regression (given in Table 1), which are by
construction less prone to measurement error and, therefore, to limited mobility
bias (see the first column of Table 7). Secondly, we estimate a new regression
for each subsample (and corresponding largest connected set) and extract the
(less precise) fixed effects to compute the correlation between the worker fixed715
effect and the firm fixed effect.
From the full sample we identify the four largest regions, four consecutive
time intervals, and three groups of workers determined by their frequency in the
sample. In each case correlations between the worker and firm fixed effects for
the various categories from the full sample are compared with their counterparts720
from the subsample. In all cases, the correlations based on the full sample
are larger than those for the subsamples, suggesting that the time span over
which the worker is observed severely biases the correlations. This suggests that
finite sample bias in the estimation of the fixed effects (the incidental parameter
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problem) as well as limited mobility bias are very important. It is patently clear725
that when we estimate the fixed effects from smaller, shorter lived samples we
increase the likelihood of small or even negative correlations. Note also that
the correlations decrease sharply in the last two periods and especially the most
recent interval (2007-2013). The evolution of wage sorting is perhaps better
depicted in Figure 1, where it is shown that the correlation between the worker730
and the firm fixed effect steadily declined from 0.308 in 1991 to 0.081 in 2013.
This evolution is in sharp contrast with the evidence presented for Germany
by Card et al. (2013) and for Denmark by Bagger et al. (2013), both of which
studies point to a sharp increase in wage sorting over time.
A number of labor market trends may have contributed to the decrease of735
wage sorting over the last 20 years of the survey. First, the average size of
Portuguese firms has declined noticeably (Braguinsky et al., 2011); second, the
fraction of minimum wage earners has increased (Carneiro et al., 2014); third,
the proportion of employed women has increased; and, finally, the fraction of
college graduates has increased markedly. However, if we take each of the com-740
positional changes, there is no indication that the reported trends lie behind the
evolution of the correlation coefficients. Indeed, it is apparent that the decrease
of wage sorting is observed within each category. In particular, the trend to-
wards less positive wage sorting occurs primarily among high wage workers, as
is shown in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 which compare the bivariate density745
function of worker and firm fixed effects for 1991 and 2013, respectively. As can
be seen, the quadrant of the figure corresponding to high wage workers and high
wage firms is thinning through time.
Figures 1 and 2 around here
7. What Can We Learn about Assortative Matching from the Esti-750
mation of Production Functions
There is a general consensus that good workers (i.e. the more productive
ones) tend to earn higher wages. Therefore, it is possible to rank workers’ pro-
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ductivity based on the individual permanent component of their wages, namely
the worker fixed effects estimated from wage equations. Similarly, good firms755
(i.e. more productive ones) tend to have higher profits. However, these firms
may pay lower or higher wages due to the presence of nonmonotonicities in
the wage schedule. Indeed, high-productivity firms have better outside options
than their low-productivity counterparts, which may exert downward pressure
on their workers’ wages. This can be particularly relevant for low-skilled workers760
who may end up being paid less than if they were working for less productive
firms (Lopes de Melo, 2008). Non-monotonicities in the wage schedule also mean
that wages reflect the marginal contribution to the value that the firm generates
and it can be either the more productive or the less productive firms that derive
higher marginal benefit from employing a better worker (Eeckhout and Kircher,765
2011). Wages do not therefore necessarily increase with firms’ productivity. As
a result, simply ranking firms according to the wages they pay will not identify
the most productive ones. Minimally, without additional data on the produc-
tivity of firms, it will not be possible to determine whether assortative sorting
is positive or negative.770
To test the hypothesis of assortative matching we rely on the estimation of
a firm-specific measure of productivity that is filtered from the heterogeneity of
job titles. Our approach can be viewed as a way of attenuating the attribution
problem flagged by Eeckhout and Kircher (2011, 900). For each production
function specification, our interest will focus on the estimate of the firm fixed775
effect which we take as our measure of productivity. Beginning with real sales as
the output measure, we otain a raw firm productivity estimate purged of time
effects from:
ln[Qft/Lft] = µf + δt + εft , (7a)
where Qft denotes real sales by firm f in year t, Lft corresponds to the number
of workers, µf identifies the firm fixed effect, δt represents year fixed effects, and780
εft is an idiosyncratic random error term.
To account for the heterogeneity of labor inputs, we next include a job title
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fixed effect, as follows:
ln[Qft/Lft] = µf + ηj + δt + εfjt , (7b)
where ηj identifies the job-title fixed effect.
Alternatively, we can employ a much-reduced set of occupation fixed effects:785
ln[Qft/Lft] = µf + γo + δt + εfot , (7c)
where γo identifies the occupation fixed effect.
In our final specification with sales as the output variable, we estimate the
parameters of a (Cobb-Douglas type) production function, where, for each firm,
we consider as many potential labor inputs as there are occupations:790
lnQft = µf +
∑
o∈Oft
ωolnLfot + δt + εft , (7d)
where Oft is the set of existing occupations in firm f at year t, Lfot gives
the number of workers filling occupation o at firm f in year t, and ωo are
output elasticities with respect to occupation o. The main reason we specify
this production function is, as in Douglas (1976), to infer the size of the labor
contribution to output. Since the total number of (harmonized) occupations is795
manageable (n = 447) this equation can be estimated using conventional fixed
effects regression estimators.
The estimation results corresponding to these four specifications are given in
the first four columns of Table 8. The correlation coefficients between the firm
productivities obtained from the production function and the worker fixed effects800
extracted from the (three-way high dimensional fixed effects) wage regression
are strikingly virtually identical, varying between 0.23 and 0.25. This suggests
the presence of positive assortative matching and that the association between
worker quality and the productivity of the firm is not significantly affected
by labor input heterogeneity. Further, when we look at the pattern of these805
correlation coefficients over time, we observe a weakening of the association
that closely mimics that earlier observed in the case of wage sorting (see Figure
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1). This suggests that the factors underlying the decrease in wage sorting may
also lie behind the decline in assortative matching. The correlation between
the firm fixed effect from the wage equation and the firm fixed effect from the810
production function is large (around 0.46) but nevertheless considerably below
1, indicating that the mapping between a firm’s wages and a firm’s productivity
is far from flawless.10
Table 8 around here
We now repeat the above exercise, using firm-level data on value added,815
thereby avoiding the issues of intermediate inputs while accounting for capital.
We were able to merge a subset of firms (233,982) for the period 2006-2013
with the Central de Balanc¸os dataset that provides extensive information on
national accounting aggregates, including value added and capital. This pro-
cedure allowed us to estimate a standard Cobb-Douglas production function of820
type:
lnYft = µf + α lnKft + β lnLft + δt + εft (7e)
where Y denotes value added, K stands for capital, and L measures labor input.
The results from the estimation of this equation are given in the sixth column
of Table 8 (the raw correlation is provided in the fifth column). When we
correlate our measure of total factor productivity, obtained from equation (7e),825
with the worker fixed effects we obtain a value of 0.23. Furthermore, when we
expand this equation to include a measure of (the log of) the number of workers
in a given occupation the correlation remains at 0.23 (column 7). And when we
control for job title heterogeneity via the presence of job title fixed effects the
correlation is somewhat reduced – to 0.18, see column 8 – suggesting that input830
10Firm size and firm age play an altogether more muted role when we consider the correlation
between the worker (wage) fixed effect and the firm fixed effect from the production function.
This indicates that measurement error is likely to play a more important role in the AKM
framework because it induces negative correlation between the worker and firm fixed effects. In
terms of industries, however, there are no significant differences between the two approaches.
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heterogeneity may play some role after all.11
Finally, we consider a model with as many potential labor inputs as there
are job titles:
lnYft = µf +
∑
j∈Jft
ξj lnLfjt + δt + εft , (7f)
where Jft is the set of existing job-titles at firm f in year t, Lfjt denotes the
number of workers, and ξj corresponds to the elasticity of output with respect835
to the labor for job title j.
Estimation of this multifactor production function is complicated by the
sheer size of the matrix of covariates. For the 2006-2013 period for which we
have value-added data available, we would need to obtain estimates for over
56,000 coefficients for the job-title elasticities, plus the year dummy coefficients840
and the critical firm fixed effects. 12 To proceed, therefore, we extended the it-
erative procedure of Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010) to this particular problem,
by portioning the total set of covariates into smaller, manageable subsets (the
approach is detailed in the Appendix). Although successful, the procedure con-
verges very slowly and requires large storage requirements. Thus, to make the845
problem simpler, we restricted our data on manufacturing alone, which sector
better fits the notion of a production function. With this restriction the number
of job titles was downsized to around 33,000.
As before, the burden of this exercise is summarized in just one correlation
coefficient. The number that we care about is the (employment-weighted) corre-850
lation coefficient between the firm averaged worker fixed effects extracted from
the main wage equation (equation 1) and the firm fixed effects obtained from
the production function. This correlation is 0.09, as can be seen from column
11Our results are broadly consistent with those given in Card et al. (2018) who show a
positive impact of the mean of log value added per worker on estimated person effects, using
Portuguese data. In their set-up, the empirical results are interpreted as indicating a sharing
of economic rents whereas we place the emphasis on positive assortative matching.
12Stata 15, which we used to accomplish all estimations, has a hard-coded limit of 10,998
covariates.
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9 of Table 8. We interpret this result as additional evidence that more produc-
tive workers tend to match with more productive firms. Overall, we have found855
robust empirical support for the notion of positive assortative matching.
These results can be seen as a useful generalisation of Mendes et al. (2010).
Our measure of worker productivity, estimated from a three fixed effects wage
equation that controls in particular for the heterogeneity of the firm’s wage poli-
cies and the skill composition of its labor force, is better suited and more precise860
than the measure of workforce quality employed by these authors (namely, the
proportion of hours worked by high-skilled workers in a firm as a share of to-
tal hours worked in that firm). Our measure of worker productivity is in turn
correlated with alternative measures of firm-specific productivity that can also
be estimated with great precision with the data at our disposal. In the case of865
equation (7f), one can think of our firm (productivity) fixed effects as a good
proxy for firm total factor productivity; and one that takes into account the
possible use of thousands of different labor inputs.13
The estimation results convey a consistent story in favour of the super-
modularity or positive assortative matching hypothesis. The similarity between870
the magnitude of the wage sorting and the assortative matching correlations
and, revealingly, their evolution over time seem to suggest that the correlations
between the estimates of person and firm fixed effects from the wage equation
may after all provide a sensible approximation to the measure of assortative
matching. Contrary evidence from similar studies may be tied to the short875
temporal dimension of the panels used. As argued earlier, fixed sample and
limited mobility biases seem the likely culprits here.
13Note that Mendes et al. (2010) estimate a panel regression in which the dependent vari-
able is the log of real sales per hour worked in firm f in year t (as in our case) and where
the independent variables are the logs of three time-varying worker quality indicators (viz.
three skill categories, measured in terms of their contributions to total hours worked), their
interactions, and two additional controls (the size of the workforce and an indicator for single-
establishment firms). The specification chosen was a translog approximation for a generalized
production function.
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8. Conclusion
We have used a large longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset to
estimate a wage equation with worker, firm, and job title fixed effects, hav-880
ing explored an econometric technique that provides an exact solution to the
least squares estimation problem arising when estimating these three high-
dimensional effects simultaneously. We decomposed the (natural log of) real
hourly wages into five components: observed time-varying characteristics, worker
heterogeneity (to include permanent observed and unobserved characteristics),885
firm heterogeneity (again both observed and unobserved), job title heterogeneity
(idem), and a residual component.
We have reported that worker heterogeneity is the most important source
of wage variation in Portugal (contributing to one third of the wage variation).
The unobserved component plays a slightly less important role (16.4 percent)890
than the observed non-time varying characteristics of workers such as gender
and education (16.6 percent). Firm effects were also found to be important (con-
tributing one fourth), due in roughly equal parts to the unobserved component
(12.6 percent) and to observed non-time-varying characteristics such regional
location, capital ownership, and industry (12.0 percent). For their part, al-895
though less important than either of the corresponding worker or firm effects,
job title fixed effects still explain an important one fifth of wage variation. This
is comparable to the importance of the education in the standard Mincerian
earnings function. The importance of job title effects in this treatment is that
they are largely observed, having a basis in real world occupational diversity900
(implying compensating differentials and differential training needs stemming
from complexity of tasks) and collective agreement impact. Note that job title
effects serve to narrow the effect of unobserved worker heterogeneity, even if
leaving its overall primacy unchallenged.
We have also reported that high-wage workers tend to be matched to firms905
paying higher wages, or “high-wage” firms. We first examined this wage sorting
by different worker/firm categories and also by region and industry, and offered
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explanations for the pattern of findings (such as the lower degree of wage sorting
observed for women than men). More important, however, was our investiga-
tion of the sensitivity of wage sorting to different sampling plans, the backdrop910
to which was our finding that, in marked contrast with much of the previous
evidence, the connection between firms’ compensation policies and the quality
of their employees is positive. Our result is driven by the fact that we are
largely attenuating finite sampling and limited mobility biases because of our
use of the entire population of Portuguese wage earners in the private sector915
stretching over a long period of time. Our experiments confirmed that the main
driver of these biases is the time span over which a worker is observed; that is
to say, when we estimate the fixed effects from smaller, shorter lived samples
we increase the likelihood of small or even negative correlations. Further con-
trasts with the wage sorting literature were apparent when we examined the920
time path of the correlations. Specifically, the correlation between the worker
and the firm fixed effect obtained from the wage equation declined steadily from
0.308 in 1991 to 0.081 in 2013.
This brings us to the key, assortative matching component of the present
treatment. As discussed in section 2, the generosity of firms’ wage policies, as925
indexed by firm (wage) fixed effects cannot be taken as evidence that they are
more productive. For this reason, we estimated firm-specific measures of pro-
ductivity extracted from production functions, while carefully controlling for the
heterogeneous composition of the workforce. Thus, while all regressions included
firm fixed effects (firm productivity) and year fixed effects, some included job930
title fixed effects (or, in their place, job title elasticities) while others deployed
occupation fixed effects (or, in their place, occupation elasticities). Separate
output measure sales and value added per worker were employed. The sales
functions could be estimated for the full sample period 1986-2013, while the
value added functions could only be estimated for the period 2006-2013 using a935
different dataset.
Irrespective of the choice of output method, the specification of the produc-
tion function, and the manner in which labor input heterogeneity was accounted
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for, evidence of positive assortative matching was reported throughout. Inter-
estingly the correlation between the worker (wage) fixed effects obtained earlier940
and the firm productivity effect from the production function was around 0.2.
This is broadly similar to the wage sorting correlation and like it also declining
through time. Although the evidence is strongly supportive of supermodular-
ity/positive assortative matching therefore, we are left with the puzzle of why
there has been a weakening of matching through time. One possibility, con-945
sistent with the material in section 6 of this paper, would be firm downsizing
among the largest firms. Another more speculative but linked line of reasoning
would be the outsourcing of the jobs of less qualified workers.
Finally, there is the issue of external validity. Specifically, is there some-
thing particularly idiosyncratic about Portuguese wage determination and its950
wage distribution that sets Portugal apart from other nations. By way of a
rejoinder, we would note that the sharp divergence between union density and
union coverage is not confined to Portugal, whose collective bargaining system is
not dissimilar from those in Spain, Italy, and France. Further, extension agree-
ments (together with informal “orientation processes”) are indeed common to955
many other continental European nations. Accordingly, while not denying the
need for more work on the wage distributions of different countries, we con-
sider it unlikely that institutional idiosyncrasies lie at the heart of the findings
on worker and firm heterogeneity and assortative matching reported here for
Portugal.960
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Appendix: Estimation of the High-Dimensional Cobb-Douglas func-
tion
The Cobb-Douglas functions that were estimated in section 7 require the im-
plementation of a high-dimensional linear regression with thousands of covari-1090
ates and one fixed effect. With conventional software it is impossible to estimate
these regressions. However these models can be estimated using a variant of the
algorithm presented in Guimara˜es and Portugal (2010). To illustrate, consider
the general linear regression model given by:
Y = X1β1 + X2β2 + ...+ Xkβk + ε
where for simplicity we are partitioning the total set of covariates into smaller1095
subsets that have a dimension with is amenable for estimation with conventional
software. Now, to estimate this model we can employ a strategy which is similar
to the one employed for estimation of our wage equation. Rewriting the normal
equations as:
(X′1X1)β1
(X′2X2)β2
...
(X′kXk)βk
 =

X′1(Y −X2β2−X3β3 − ...−Xkβk)
X′2(Y −X1β1−X3β3 − ...−Xkβk)
...
X′k(Y −X1β1−X2β2 − ...−Xk−1βk−1)
 =

X′1Y
∗
1
X′2Y
∗
2
...
X′kY
∗
k

we can iterate across the equations taking as known the βs that show up on the1100
right-hand side (replacing them by the last known estimates) and estimating
the βs on the left-hand side by implementing the linear regression implied by
the above equations. Again, this is a process that will converge slowly but
steadily. A fixed effect can be easily added. One option is to assume that one
of the subsets consists of all the dummy variables that define the fixed effect.1105
In this case the estimation step associated with the fixed effect consists on the
calculation of simple group means.
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Table 1: Fitted wage equation with worker, firm, and job title fixed effects
Variable Two HD fixed effects Three HD fixed effects
Age squared (years) −0.0003 −0.0002
(−5, 069.7) (−5, 724.4)
Tenure 0.0095 0.0068
(847.2) (541.9)
Tenure squared −0.0020 −0.0016
(−558.5) (−393.0)
Firm size (in logs) 0.0426 0.0431
(2, 645.8) (4, 013.1)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Job-title fixed effects No Yes
Number of observations 36, 558, 896 36, 558, 896
R-squared 0.8801 0.8915
Note: t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with worker-cluster robust standard er-
rors.
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Table 2: Regression estimates of worker fixed effects on non-time-varying worker characteris-
tics
Variable Coefficient
Female −0.1428
(−668.7)
Schooling
First stage of basic education 0.0768
(167.6)
Second stage of basic education 0.1516
(304.6)
Third stage of basic education 0.2164
(414.3)
Secondary education 0.2825
(517.5)
Post secondary education 0.4023
(225.9)
First stage of tertiary education 0.5070
(499.4)
Second stage of tertiary education 0.5425
(682.6)
Birth year dummies Yes
Observations 36, 558, 896
R-squared 0.6440
Note: t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with worker-
cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 3: Regression estimates of firm fixed effects on non-time varying firm characteristics
Variable Coefficient
Regions
Center 0.0178
(5.4)
Lisboa and Tagus Valley 0.0802
(15.9)
Alentejo 0.0502
(8.0)
Algarve 0.1039
(19.6)
Madeira and Azores 0.0796
(14.0)
Share of domestic capital −0.14
(−10.9)
Share of public capital 0.03
(0.8)
Industry dummies Yes
Observations 639, 708
R-squared 0.3235
Note: Regression weighted by firm employment. t-
statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with firm-
cluster robust standard errors.
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Table 5: Contributions of compensation components to wage variation
Two HD fixed effects Three HD fixed effects
Total 1 100.0% 100.0%
Predicted effects of X variablesa 2 13.0% 12.4%
Time 2.1 14.8% 11.0%
Worker time-varying 2.2 −7.9% −4.9%
Firm time-varying 2.3 6.1% 6.2%
Worker fixed effects 3 47.9% 33.0%
unobserved component 3.1 21.2% 16.4%
observed componentb 3.2 26.7% 16.6%
Firm fixed effects 4 27.1% 24.6%
unobserved component 4.1 13.3% 12.6%
observed componentc 4.2 13.8% 12.0%
Job title fixed effects 5 19%
unobserved component 5.1 4.1%
observed component d 5.2 14.9%
Residual 6 12.0% 11.0%
a The time-varying observable characteristics of workers (firms) are age squared, seniority, and seniority
squared (firm size). b Gender and seven education dummies. c Capital ownership (shares of domestic
and public capital), five region dummies, and twenty-eight industry dummies. d Occupation and collective
agreement.
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Table 6: Correlation between worker and firm fixed effects by worker and firm characteristics
Age Firm Size
16-25 -0.031 1st quartile (<= 13) -0.104
26-45 0.188 2d quartile (14-56) 0.136
> 45 0.253 3d quartile (57-299) 0.208
4th quartile (> 299) 0.324
Gender Firm Age
male 0.214 1st quartile (<= 9) 0.177
female 0.177 2d quartile (10-17) 0.151
3rd quartile (18-30) 0.168
Wages 4th quartile (>= 31) 0.255
minimum wage earner -0.371 Industries
non-minimum wage earner 0.183 Mining 0.136
Manufacturing 0.218
Tenure Utilities -0.080
<= 5 0.076 Construction 0.049
6-20 0.222 Trade 0.099
> 20 0.309 Hotels and Restaurants 0.004
Transportation 0.005
Education Other Services 0.279
No schooling 0.126 Region
Basic I 0.169 North 0.132
Basic II 0.194 Center 0.009
Basic III 0.241 Lisboa and Tagus Valley 0.233
Secondary 0.219 Alentejo 0.022
Tertiary 0.126 Algarve -0.052
Madeira and Azores 0.106
48
Table 7: Correlation between worker and firm fixed effects for selected subsamples
overall regression regression on subsamples
District
Lisboa (N = 11, 828, 134) 0.241 0.220
Porto (N = 7, 340, 920) 0.194 0.141
Braga (N = 3, 400, 304) −0.016 −0.071
Aveiro (N = 2, 771, 477) 0.026 0.007
Period
1986-1993 (N = 6, 838, 724) 0.282 0.051
1994-2000 (N = 8, 722, 171) 0.273 0.086
2002-2007 (N = 8, 331, 974) 0.163 0.000
2007-2013 (N = 8, 061, 445) 0.103 −0.032
Number of Years in the Sample
<= 5 (N = 7, 232, 389) 0.122 −0.052
6− 15 (N = 19, 243, 021) 0.245 0.164
>= 16 (N = 8, 819, 214) 0.362 0.134
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics (N = 36, 558, 896)
Mean S.D.
Real hourly wages (in logs) 0.3357 0.5683
Age (in years) 37.4732 10.9332
Tenure (in years) 8.3221 8.4883
Gender (female=1) 0.4150 −
Schooling
No Schooling 0.0241 −
First stage of basic education 0.3216 −
Second stage of basic education 0.2129 −
Third stage of basic education 0.1865 −
Secondary education 0.1765 −
Post secondary education 0.0026 −
First stage of tertiary education 0.0163 −
Second stage of tertiary education 0.0595 −
Regions
North 0.3644 −
Center 0.1787 −
Lisboa and Tagus Valley 0.3523 −
Alentejo 0.0413 −
Algarve 0.0311 −
Madeira and Azores 0.0321 −
Firm size (in logs) 4.2877 2.2104
Share of domestic capital 0.9024 0.2815
Share of public capital 0.0480 0.2071
Number of jobs per worker 1.794 1.1817
Fraction of movers 0.4309 -
51
T
a
b
le
A
2
:
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
s
b
et
w
ee
n
co
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
(T
w
o
H
D
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
)
1
2
2
.1
2
.2
2
.3
3
3
.1
3
.2
4
4
.1
4
.2
lo
g
o
f
re
a
l
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
(1
9
8
6
p
ri
ce
s)
1
1
P
re
d
ic
te
d
eff
ec
ts
o
f
X
va
ri
a
b
le
sa
2
0
.1
8
8
1
T
im
e
2
.1
0
.2
3
9
0
.7
8
8
1
W
o
rk
er
ti
m
e-
va
ry
in
g
2
.2
−0
.1
9
4
2
0
.4
5
9
−0
.1
3
3
1
F
ir
m
ti
m
e-
va
ry
in
g
2
.3
0
.3
7
0
0
.1
0
7
−0
.1
2
4
−0
.0
3
5
1
W
o
rk
er
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
3
0
.5
5
3
−0
.5
9
4
−0
.3
4
8
−0
.5
6
2
0
.2
0
1
1
U
n
o
b
se
rv
ed
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
3
.1
0
.4
5
9
−0
.0
1
4
−0
.0
7
0
0
.0
5
8
0
.0
6
3
0
.5
3
3
1
o
b
se
rv
ed
co
m
p
o
n
en
tb
3
.2
0
.3
6
4
−0
.6
9
3
−0
.3
6
7
−0
.7
0
1
0
.1
9
8
0
.8
4
7
0
.0
0
0
1
F
ir
m
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
4
0
.6
3
9
0
.0
2
4
−0
.0
1
3
−0
.0
5
8
0
.2
8
8
0
.2
2
9
0
.0
2
5
0
.2
5
5
1
u
n
o
b
se
rv
ed
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
4
.1
0
.3
9
2
−0
.0
0
4
−0
.0
0
8
−0
.0
0
8
0
.0
3
4
0
.0
6
5
−0
.0
5
2
0
.1
0
9
0
.8
0
0
1
o
b
se
rv
ed
co
m
p
o
n
en
tc
4
.2
0
.5
4
1
0
.0
4
4
−0
.0
1
1
−0
.0
8
5
0
.4
3
5
0
.2
9
5
0
.1
1
0
0
.2
8
0
0
.6
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
a
T
h
e
t
im
e
-v
a
r
y
in
g
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
b
le
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
is
t
ic
s
o
f
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
(
fi
r
m
s
)
a
r
e
a
g
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
,
s
e
n
io
r
it
y
,
a
n
d
s
e
n
io
r
it
y
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
(
fi
r
m
s
iz
e
)
.
b
G
e
n
d
e
r
a
n
d
s
e
v
e
n
e
d
u
c
a
t
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s
.
c
C
a
p
it
a
l
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
ip
(
s
h
a
r
e
s
o
f
d
o
m
e
s
t
ic
a
n
d
p
u
b
li
c
c
a
p
it
a
l)
,
fi
v
e
r
e
g
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s
,
a
n
d
t
w
e
n
t
y
-e
ig
h
t
in
d
u
s
t
r
y
d
u
m
m
ie
s
.
d
O
c
c
u
p
a
t
io
n
a
n
d
c
o
ll
e
c
t
iv
e
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
.
52
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
.
3
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
Wage sorting Assortative matching
Figure 1: Correlation between the worker and the firm fixed effect over time
53
Fir
m
 fix
ed
 ef
fec
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0W
orker fixed effect
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Biv. Density
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0scale
(a) Panel A (1991)
Fir
m
 fix
ed
 ef
fec
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0W
orker fixed effect
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Biv. Density
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0scale
(b) Panel B (2013)
Figure 2: Bivariate density of worker and firm fixed effects
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